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ABSTRACT
Frege characterizes judgement as the acknowledgement of the truth of a
thought, appearing thereby to rule out false judgement. First in this paper I
explain Frege’s characterization so that it does not have this consequence.
Frege is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for S to
acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. Rather, he is articulating
judgement’s nature within self-consciousness. From within, to judge means to
acknowledge a truth. Second, I suggest that this articulation is centrally
operative in Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. As Frege argues,
it follows from judgement’s self-consciousness that truth is indefinable.
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1.
“By Judgment, I understand the acknowledgment of the truth of a thought”
(Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 9). This characterization is found throughout
Frege’s work from 1891,1 and there is no reason to suppose that the con-
ception of judgement it represents was not operable before that date (just
replace the word ‘thought’ with the words ‘judgeable content’). As here in
Basic Laws of Arithmetic, it commonly appears as an introductory explanation
of what Frege means by judgement: Frege seems to think that once given the
phrase ‘acknowledgement of the truth of a thought’, his reader will recognize
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straightforwardly enough the act it articulates. In fact, however, Frege’s
characterization has occasioned a good deal of perplexity, and it is not
hard to see why. Acknowledging (recognizing, anerkennen) the truth of a
thought seems to mean coming to know a thought’s truth, but judgement
surely does not entail knowledge.2 And even if this matter of knowledge is
elided, the characterization would, in any case, appear to rule out false judge-
ment. A subject cannot recognize the truth of something that is not true.
Judgement plays a central role within Frege’s philosophy, and the evident
puzzle of his ubiquitous characterization has given rise to a debate in the second-
ary literature. Participants in this debate fall broadly into two camps. First, there
are commentators who bite the bullet, embracing implications of knowledge and
factivity. Anscombe, for example, wrote that “being asserted (in this logical sense)
is, for both Russell and Frege, something that cannot possibly attach to a prop-
osition unless it is true” (Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 114). Thomas
Ricketts writes that for Frege, “to make a judgement is to acquire a piece of
knowledge” (“Logic and Truth in Frege”, 131). And Mark Textor has held that
“only if a thought is a mode of presentation of the True can its truth be acknowl-
edged” (“Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth”, 641). (False judge-
ments, Textor suggests, are to be understood as failed attempts at judgement
(“Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth”, 642).) Commentators in the
second camp baulk at this embrace. Dummett, for example, maintains that
such “absurdities” as that judgement and assertion cannot be false should not
be ascribed to Frege (The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, 5; see also Frege:
Philosophy of Language, 312–14). Frege’s characterization, he implies, is simply
clumsy, or at least theoretically unimportant. Michael Kremer agrees with
Dummett that Fregean judgement can be false, but rather than setting Frege’s
characterization aside, he gives it a disarming reading: “The linguistic norms of
nineteenth century philosophical German”, Kremer holds, permit an understand-
ing of Frege’s verb ‘anerkennen’ on which it is non-factive (“Judgment and Truth
in Frege”, 557). Frege is characterizing judgement not as knowing-true but simply
as ‘holding-true’ (“Judgment and Truth in Frege”, 567, 575).
As Kremer notes, there are occasional passages in which Frege appears to
countenance false judgement.3 But the principle argument in favour of the
Dummett-Kremer view is more global: Frege’s work is simply not illuminated
philosophically by the ascription of a position that someone judges only if
they know. Balanced against this general consideration, on the other hand,
is not just Frege’s characterization itself, but also certain related discussions
of inference. To infer, for Frege, is to make a judgement. Indeed, it is to
make a judgement on the basis of prior judgements, so that “before
2Indeed, Frege occasionally interchanges talk of acknowledging a thought as true (anerkennen als wahr)
with talk of knowing a thought to be true (wissen, dass er wahr ist). See for example PMC, 20.
3See Kremer, “Judgment and Truth in Frege”, 574.
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acknowledging its truth, one cannot use a thought as a premise of an infer-
ence” (CP, 402). And from here Frege appears clearly to infer that inference is
made only from truth. For example:
From false premises nothing at all can be concluded. A mere thought, which is
not recognized as true, cannot be a premise. Only after a thought has been
recognized by me as true, can it be a premise for me.
(PMC, 182)
A premise is something judged – that is, recognized as true – and so a
premise must be something true.
There is, then, a genuine difficulty of interpretation. How can we agree
with Dummett that Fregean judgement is fallible, whilst taking Frege’s
characterization seriously as aligning judgement with knowledge? How can
we agree that a judgement may be false whilst allowing that because a
premise is something judged, no inference is possible from falsity? Solving
this difficulty is the first ambition of this paper. The second ambition is to
set out from there an interpretation of Frege’s famous argument for the
indefinability of truth. Various authors have suggested that this argument
draws on Frege’s conception of judgement. I shall agree. Indeed, I shall
suggest that a proper understanding of what Frege means in calling judge-
ment the recognition of a truth provides for a reading of the argument
which is both exegetically sound and philosophically compelling.
2.
It is central to this paper that Fregean judgement is a self-conscious act.
Indeed, my proposal for Frege’s characterization will be that it articulates jud-
gement’s nature within self-consciousness. Frege is not specifying what judge-
ment is from without. He is not saying that for a subject S to judge that p is for
S to acknowledge the truth of the thought that p. That would render judge-
ment infallible. Rather, Frege is specifying what judgement is from within.
From within, to judge means to acknowledge a truth.
Understanding this proposal will require, first, an indication of the general
idea of a self-conscious act. And for this we shall need to look beyond Frege.
Let’s begin, then, by considering some remarks instead of Sebastian Rödl.
Rödl writes of intentional bodily action:
My knowing first-personally that I am doing such-and-such is the same reality as
my doing it.
(Self-consciousness, ix)
Where the subject writes a letter, or looks for an apple, she therein under-
stands or knows herself to be writing a letter, or looking for an apple. Her
self-understanding as acting is not something additional to her acting;
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rather, it is her acting. This identity defines the general idea of a self-conscious
act. And it has application, Rödl holds, beyond intentional bodily action. In
particular, it applies also to judgement:
In judging that things are so, I understand myself to do that: judge that things
are so. I understand that in judging. I do not, on the one hand, judge that things
are so, and, on the other hand, think that I do. My judging something and my
comprehending myself to judge it are one act of the mind.
(“Self-consciousness, Negation, and Disagreement”, 215)
In judging that p, the subject self-understands as so judging. And this means:
the subject’s judging that p is her self-understanding as so judging.
This idea of a self-conscious act has been adopted and developed by
various authors.4 Clearly, though, it will be difficult to understand. And
whilst a paper on Frege cannot aim for a sustained elaboration, a certain
comment will be helpful to clarify the idea’s basic shape, and with that to
defuse a couple of natural objections.
For a self-conscious act φ, we’re saying, to φmeans to self-comprehendingly
φ. The subject’s φ-ing is her self-comprehension as φ-ing. To say this is not,
however, to make an identification. The proposed identity of acting and self-
understanding, someone might object, is obviously unworkable, for it is as
plain as day that whatever is meant by the subject’s self-understanding as
looking for an apple – perhaps we mean that she makes a first-personal judge-
ment, or that she enjoys a certain self-awareness – this will be something
different from her looking. Looking for something is patently different from
making a judgement. The answer to this natural objection is that the subject’s
looking is indeed not a judgement, but this is not what is being proposed.
Indeed, the looking is not being identified with any separately understood act
of self-comprehension. (The idea is precisely not this: You know what looking
is, right? And you know what it is to self-understand as looking? Well here’s
something interesting you probably didn’t know: if someone is looking, then
their looking is the same thing as their self-understanding as looking! (This is
not Hesperus and Phosphorus)). It belongs to the proposal, rather, that the
self-understanding in question is theoretically proper to self-consciousness,
and explicable only in hand with that idea. A self-conscious act is fundamentally
self-conscious, where this means it is understood theoretically only as such.5 And
equally, the subject’s self-understanding in acting is fundamentally just that: the
self-understanding of a self-conscious act. Such a comprehension has no articu-
lation separate from its identity with the self-conscious act.6
4Besides Rödl see for example Kern, Sources of Knowledge, Kimhi, Thinking and Being, and McDowell,
“Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality”.
5The philosophical articulation of intentional bodily action, say, should explain it as a species of compre-
hension; for this see Anscombe, Intention.
6The idiosyncratic language of ‘self-understanding’ is intended to underline that what we are speaking of
is not separately comprehensible as, say, a first-personal judgement or self-awareness.
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This first natural objection relates also to a second. If mental acts are in
general self-conscious, someone might wonder, does this not mean that
the subject’s self-understanding will be self-conscious? So where the
subject φs, will she not self-understand as self-understanding as φ-ing as
well as self-understanding as φ-ing – and so on into a regress? This objection
misunderstands again the proposal’s basic form. The idea of self-conscious-
ness is not the idea of a higher order act directed on a lower order looking
(say), so that we can ask whether the directed, higher order act is not also
self-conscious, and then worry about a regress up the orders. (In particular,
the self-understanding as looking is not a judgement about a looking.)
Rather, there is a single, unitary act and with that no grip for a regress. The
answer to the question posed is, therefore, that no, the subject does not
‘self-understand as self-understanding as φ-ing’ as well as self-understanding
as φ-ing. Rather, to say the subject self-understands as self-understanding as
φ-ing will, if it means anything at all, mean simply that she self-understands as
φ-ing.7
3.
Let’s return now to Frege. And let’s consider with Frege some comments by
Maria van der Schaar. Van der Schaar argues at length that Frege’s concern
with judgement is centrally a concern with judgement “from a first-person
point of view” (“Frege on Judgment and the Judging Agent”, 238). In this
context, she considers Frege’s characterization of judgement as the recog-
nition of the truth of a thought. She writes:
The distinction between first- and third-person perspective may be used to
clarify the lack of conceptual distinction in these places between judgement
and knowledge. When we look at judgement from a third-person point of
view, there is a conceptual difference between, on the one hand, judgement
or belief, and, on the other hand, knowledge, but from a first-person
point of view one takes one’s judgement to be true and justified, that is, to
be knowledge.
(“Frege on Judgment and the Judging Agent”, 243)
Van der Schaar makes here a pair of closely connected suggestions. First, she
claims that whilst from a third-person point of view there is a conceptual
difference between judgement and knowledge, there is no such difference
from a first-person point of view. And second, she holds that “from a first-
person point of view one takes one’s judgment … to be knowledge”
(“Frege on Judgment and the Judging Agent”, 243). The claim of no
7Consider here Kant’s “I think [which] must be able to accompany all my representations” (Critique of Pure
Reason, B 132). This is the ‘I think’ of self-conscious representation. And as Kant insists, this ‘I think’
“cannot be accompanied by any further representation” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 132). There is,
this is to say, no ‘I think I think’ further to the ‘I think’.
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conceptual difference is in effect, I think, Frege’s characterization. But to
understand it, we shall need first to understand van der Schaar’s other
claim, her claim that the subject takes her judgement to be knowledge.
And for this we need to consider judgement’s self-consciousness.
Rödl holds judgement to be a self-conscious act, writing that “my judging
something and my comprehending myself to judge it are one act of the
mind” (“Self-consciousness, Negation, and Disagreement”, 215). But there is
more to be explained of judgement’s self-consciousness than is explicit in
this sentence. Consider Irad Kimhi’s reaction to an argument of Peter
Geach. What Geach’s argument shows, Kimhi writes:
is that there is no gap between one’s judging something (p) and one’s assess-
ment of the same judgment as true (“I am truly judging p”). The transition from
a judgment to a truth-assessment of that judgment is not based on a recog-
nition of any new fact. A proper philosophical account of this matter must
allow us to say that the assessment of one’s judgment as true is internal to
the very act of judging.
(Thinking and Being, 7)
And Rödl, again, writes:
A judgment represents itself as correct; it represents itself as conforming to the
measure by which, as judgment, it is subject. When we say that a judgment rep-
resents itself as correct, we mean that a judgment and its representation as
correct are one act: the representation of the judgment as correct is not a
second order representation, whose object is the judgment; rather it is the judg-
ment itself. We may – and will – express this by saying that a judgment not only
is true but refers itself to the truth.
(Categories of the Temporal, 60)
There is no gap between the subject’s judging that p and the representation
of her judgement as correct. There is no gap, that is, between the subject’s
judging that p and her self-understanding as judging truly that p. In
judging, the subject self-understands not as ‘merely judging’, but as
judging correctly – that is as judging truly.
The idea of a self-understanding as acting correctly is not peculiar to jud-
gement. There are other self-conscious acts which carry an internal measure
of correctness, and with that the distinctive form of self-consciousness here in
view. In reading a text out loud, for example, the subject self-understands as
reading correctly, that is as reading faithfully. In calculating a sum, the subject
self-understands as calculating correctly. In (deductively) inferring, the
subject self-understands as inferring correctly, that is as inferring validly.
And in judging, the subject self-understands as judging correctly, that is as
judging truly. Accepting this general form of self-consciousness, we may, I
however think, take a step beyond Rödl and Kimhi in the case of judgement.
Rödl suggests that judgement’s internal measure of correctness is truth. But
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the perfection of judgement is not mere true judgement, but knowledge. And
so the judging subject’s self-understanding as judging correctly is not a self-
understanding as ‘merely judging truly’, but a self-understanding as knowing.
The judging subject does, as Rödl asserts, self-understand as judging. And she
does, as Kimhi and Rödl both assert, self-understand as judging truly. Funda-
mentally, though, the judging subject self-understands as knowing.
Van der Schaar writes that “from a first-person point of view one takes
one’s judgement … to be knowledge” (“Frege on Judgment and the
Judging Agent”, 243). This is not the claim that the subject makes a
second-order assessment of her judgement as a piece of knowledge, or is
liable to make such an assessment. The claim is not that as and when the
subject brings her judgement into view, she will rate that judgement as
knowledge (good work me!). Rather, the subject takes her judgement to be
knowledge in the sense that her judgement that p is a self-understanding
as knowing that p. In judging that p, the subject self-understands as
knowing that p. And from here we may move to an understanding also of
van der Schaar’s first point, her claim of a lack of conceptual difference
from the first-person point of view between judgement and knowledge.
The judging subject, we have said, self-understands as judging, as judging
truly, and as knowing. This does not mean, however, that she has three
different self-understandings, of increasing strength. It means, rather, that
from within, to judge is to judge truly, or again to judge is to know. The sub-
ject’s self-understanding as judging is a self-understanding as knowing.
Within self-consciousness, the act of judgement is the act of knowledge: it
is the act of recognizing a truth.8 And this is my suggestion for Frege’s charac-
terization: he is articulating the nature of judgement within self-conscious-
ness. Frege is not identifying judgement by specifying what it is from
without. He is not saying that to think of a person as judging is to think of
them as recognizing the truth of a thought. Rather, he is identifying judge-
ment by specifying what it is from within. To self-understand as judging is
to self-understand as recognizing the truth of a thought. To judge that p is
to recognize the truth of the thought that p.
4.
We considered above a difficulty of how Frege’s characterization could be
what it seems to be, namely an articulation of judgement as knowledge,
without its rendering judgement infallible. The current proposal solves this
8Compare Rödl on judgement as correct judgement: “It is easy to see why understanding oneself to
judge, or assert, is taking oneself to judge, or assert, correctly: the concept of judgement, or assertion,
is the concept of correct judgement, or assertion. She who judges that things are so judges with the
concept of judgement, and this is to say, with the concept of correct judgement” (“Self-consciousness,
Negation, and Disagreement”, 216).
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difficulty. From within, judgement is knowledge, but this does not rule out
that someone may judge falsely, for what from within is a knowing may
from without be a false belief. The proposal remains nonetheless underdeve-
loped, both systematically and exegetically. Systematically, the matter of self-
consciousness, and more particularly the identity within self-consciousness of
judgement and knowledge, has obviously not been given full elaboration.
But this is a paper on Frege, so I shall leave that task to one side in favour
of an attempt at exegetical progress. In section 1 we briefly considered
certain comments on inference, and, in what follows, I shall revisit Frege’s
thinking here. Primarily, though, I want to use our understanding of Frege’s
characterization to arrive at an interpretation of his famous argument for
the indefinability of truth. Before addressing either of these two matters,
however, we shall need first of all to consider a claim in Frege that every jud-
gement is at once a judgement of truth.
5.
Frege frequently speaks of subjects as ‘holding thoughts true’ ( fürwahrhal-
ten), and apparently understands judgement as such an act. (So he writes
in “On Sense and Meaning” that the True and the False “are recognised, if
only implicitly, by everybody who judges at all, who holds something true”
(CP, 163).9) Similarly, assertion is described as ‘putting a thought forward as
true’ (als wahr hingestellen) (see e.g. PMC, 20). These expressions are not typi-
cally intended to give the reader pause, and consonant with this we might
look to read them in a theoretically anodyne manner. Specifically, the ‘true’
in ‘holding a thought true’ (or the ‘as true’ in ‘putting a thought forward as
true’) might be taken to attach to the verb, and to do so as a merely peri-
phrastic expansion. Holding the thought that p true means holding-true
the thought that p, which means holding-true that p, which means –
simply – holding that p. (Putting the thought that p forward as true means
putting-forward-as-true the thought that p, which means putting-forward-
as-true that p, which means – simply – putting forward that p.)
In certain places, however, Frege connects truth with judgement and
assertion in a manner on which he clearly does intend his reader to pause,
and which cannot be given an anodyne reading. So he writes in “Thoughts”
that “we cannot recognise a property of a thing without at the same time
finding the thought this thing has this property to be true” (CP, 354). And in
the second “Logic” manuscript we find:
What, in the first place, distinguishes [truth] from all other predicates is that pre-
dicating it is always included in predicating anything whatever. If I assert that
9I follow here Kremer’s manifestly correct translation (“Judgment and Truth in Frege”, 572). See §6 of
Kremer’s paper for further evidence of Frege thinking of judgement as (a species of) holding-true.
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the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, then I thereby assert that it is true that 2 and 3 make 5.
(PW, 129)
Recognizing or asserting a certain thought, Frege says, means recognizing or
asserting that thought to be true. Here the ‘true’ is explicitly attached not to
the verb, not to the recognizing or asserting, but to the verb’s object, the
thought recognized or asserted. Recognizing or asserting that pmeans recog-
nizing or asserting that it is true that p.
But why should this be so? Why does taking Jack to be tall mean, or
include, taking the thought that Jack is tall to be true? Why does asserting
that Jill is happy mean, or include, asserting that it is true that Jill is happy?
A straightforward answer to this question appeals to a well-known
Fregean doctrine of thoughts and truth. “The sentence ‘I smell the scent of
violets’”, Frege writes, “has just the same content as the sentence ‘It is true
that I smell the scent of violets’” (CP, 354). Or again, “if I assert ‘It is true
that sea-water is salt’ I assert the same thing as if I assert ‘Sea-water is salt’”
(PW, 251). In general, the thought that it is true that p is the same thought,
Frege holds, as the thought that p. Let’s call this doctrine ‘truth-identity’.
And it is truth-identity, someone might propose, that explains why for
Frege asserting or judging or holding that p includes asserting or judging
or holding that it is true that p. Judging that p includes judging that it is
true that p, because that p and that it is true that p are the very same
thing to judge. Judging the one includes judging the other because the
one is the other.
Straightforward as this answer may be, it does not provide a plausible
reading of the passages cited. One way to be suspicious of it is to note
that the explanation it offers of why recognizing or asserting that p includes
recognizing or asserting that it is true that p is indifferent to the fact that we
are talking here of recognising and asserting. In exactly the same way that
holding that p means holding that it is true that p, so supposing or hoping
that p will mean supposing or hoping that it is true that p. And this does
not seem faithful to Frege’s intentions. The impression had in reading
these passages is that Frege is making a point about the specific prop-
ositional acts he mentions (these are acts of commitment), rather than a
point whose substance regards only the fact that they are propositional
acts. And this impression is not without foundation. There is no mention of
truth-identity in the vicinity of the “Logic” passage: Frege apparently
expects his reader to recognize that the assertion that p includes the assertion
that it is true that p independently of any recognition they may have of truth-
identity. And whilst Frege does in “Thoughts” mention truth-identity along-
side his claim of finding a thought to be true, he does so in the following way:
[W]e cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding
the thought this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of
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a thing is joined a property of a thought, namely, that of truth. It is also worthy
of notice that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has just the same
content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the scent of violets”.
(CP, 354)
Here, Frege’s claim of recognition and finding is explicitly not justified by
reference to truth-identity. On the contrary, Frege presents truth-identity as
something explanatorily separate: this, he says, is something also worthy of
notice.10
So how else might we explain Frege’s position? Why, if not because of
truth-identity, does judging that p mean holding the thought that p to be
true? The answer I want to propose is that this is a more or less straightfor-
ward consequence of judgement’s self-consciousness. In judging, we have
said, the subject self-understands as judging correctly; and so in judging, it
follows, the subject holds what she judges to be true. Let’s spell this impli-
cation out. In judging that p the subject self-understands as knowing that
p, that is, as judging truly that p. It is a condition, however, on self-under-
standing as judging truly that the subject understand what she judges to
be true. Judging truly means for Frege judging a truth, and so taking
oneself to judge truly that p means taking that p to be true. And together
these deliver the result. They deliver that the subject judges that p only if
she takes that p to be true. In judging, the subject understands what she
judges to be true.
6.
The claim that the subject self-understands as judging truly that p only if she
holds that p to be true needs elaboration. In particular, there is a question of
the sense here of ‘holding’. A full response to this question would again pull
us away from Frege into an account of self-consciousness. But in short, the
thought will be that in this condition ‘holding’ speaks generally of an act
for which truth is an internal measure of correctness. Self-understanding is
a species of such holding. If the subject self-understands as acting in a
certain way when she is not so acting, then her self-understanding is false
and as such is mistaken. And it is because self-understanding is a species
of holding that the subject self-understands as judging truly that p only if
she holds that p to be true. Judging truly means for Frege judging a truth.
So, much as hoping or supposing Jack to judge truly that p means hoping
10This leaves a nice question of how else to understand their proximity. One possibility is that these
points are little more than a list of interesting stuff in a context of Frege’s introducing his reader to
the idea of thoughts as imperceptible senses of sentences, things for which the question of truth
arises. More likely, I think, Frege is inviting his reader to notice truth-identity in order to forestall an
obvious concern with the recognition claim that it generates a regress. If recognizing a property of
a thing means at the same time recognizing a thought to be true, then it must mean also recognizing
the thought that that thought is true to be true, and so on. But we’ll come to this regress below.
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or supposing that p to be true, and much as judging Jack to judge truly that p
means judging that p to be true, so holding oneself to judge truly that p
means holding that p to be true.
There are points in Frege’s work where the current result – viz. that
because the subject’s self-understanding in judgement is as judging cor-
rectly, she judges that p only if she takes that p to be true – breaks the
surface and finds explicit voice, in particular the passages considered
above from “Logic” and “Thoughts”. But it also lurks beneath the surface in
various other places, motivating and explaining more explicitly expressed
views. One such place is Frege’s discussions of inference. Another is his argu-
ment for the indefinability of truth. Let’s now consider these in turn.
As we have seen, Frege asserts that no inference is possible from some-
thing false. And he appears to explain this by reference to the fact that the
premise of an inference is something judged – that is, something recognized
as true. So Frege appears to detach being true from being recognized as true.
Insofar as this appearance is right, Kremer’s view will be wrong that Frege’s
phrase ‘recognising the truth of a thought’ means no more than ‘holding a
thought true’. On the other hand, the discussions of inference where this
detachment is apparent do not provide unequivocal support either for the
opposing view of Ricketts and Textor that a person judges that p only if p.
For whilst this view immediately explains Frege’s repeated rejection of infer-
ence from falsity, it leaves us somewhat surprised at another of the passages’
recurring features. Frege writes:
From false premises nothing at all can be concluded. A mere thought, which is
not recognized as true, cannot be a premise. Only after a thought has been
recognized by me as true, can it be a premise for me. Mere hypotheses
cannot be used as premises.
(PMC, 182)
[W]e can draw no conclusion from something false. But it might perhaps be
asked, can we not, all the same, draw consequences from a sentence which
may be false, in order to see what we should get if it were true?
(PW, 244)
Only true thoughts can be premises of inferences. … But, one might
perhaps object surely one can make deductions from certain thoughts purely
hypothetically without judging the truth of the latter.
(CP, 335)
In each of these passages, the rejection of inference from falsity is directly
connected to a rejection of inference from a hypothesis. This second rejection
is not in itself surprising. Inference as Frege conceives it is a movement
between judgements: “an inference … is the pronouncement of a judgment
made in accordance with logical laws on the basis of previously passed judg-
ments” (CP, 318). Hypothetical reasoning, it follows, must be understood
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other than as inference from a hypothesis. And nor is it surprising that Frege
considers hypothetical reasoning as a potential counterexample to the claim
that inference is made only from truth: a hypothesis may, of course, be false.
What will rather be surprising from the perspective of Ricketts and Textor is
Frege’s repeated treatment of hypothetical reasoning as the potential coun-
terexample to his rejection of inference from falsity. Why is that the natural
objection – indeed the only objection – for an interlocutor to raise? What
about the more glaring case of someone who (as we should say) falsely
believes that p and then (as we should say) reasons from that false belief
to the thought that q?
Unlike both Kremer and Ricketts and Textor, we are in a position to provide
a seamless reading of Frege’s discussions of inference. Frege insists quite
rightly that because judgement is the recognition of truth, inference is
made only from truth. But when he moves then to consider suppositional
reasoning, he is not passing over the possibility of someone’s reasoning
from a false belief, for Frege’s comments in these passages are not claims
as to what someone – a person – can or cannot do.
The premise of an inference is something judged. In judging the subject
understands herself to judge truly. And in self-understanding as judging
truly, the subject understands what she judges to be true. So, inference is
made from truth. (“Of course we cannot infer anything from a false
thought” (CP, 375) – of course!) The detachment of the truth of a thought
from the recognition of its truth, this is to say, is a detachment within self-con-
sciousness. Frege is not describing inference from without. In particular, he is
not saying that to think of someone as inferring is to think of them as making
a judgement on the basis of a true premise. Rather, he is describing inference
from within. To self-understand as inferring is to self-understand as recogniz-
ing a truth on the basis of previously recognized truths. Against this we might
raise a worry that inference may be made from a supposition, and so from
something which is not recognized as true. But it betrays a misunderstanding
of the basic nature of Frege’s theorizing to raise as an objection that someone
can surely reason from falsehood. Of course someone – a subject – can infer
from falsehood. But Frege is not telling us what it is for a subject to infer, he is
telling us what it is for the subject to infer.
7.
This same point applies to Frege’s characterization of inference as “a judg-
ment made in accordance with logical laws on the basis of previously
passed judgment” (CP, 318, italics added). This characterization, someone
might object, bizarrely and quite mistakenly rules out invalid inference, just
as the characterization of judgement bizarrely and quite mistakenly rules
out false judgement. But again, Frege is specifying inference’s nature for
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the subject, and for the subject inference is correct inference, just as judge-
ment is for the subject correct judgement. That’s enough now, however,
on inference; let’s move on to truth’s indefinability.
Frege’s assertion in the “Logic” manuscript that predicating truth is
included in all predication immediately follows in the same paragraph an
early version of Frege’s argument for the indefinability of truth. And following
his example of asserting the sum of 2 and 3 to be 5, Frege gives as a second
example that “I assert that it is true that my idea of Cologne Cathedral agrees
with reality, if I assert that it agrees with reality” (PW, 129). I want to suggest
that this colocation and choice of example is no coincidence: Frege’s indefin-
ability argument centrally involves the understanding of judgement and
truth on display in these sentences.
Let’s consider the later statement of the argument given in “Thoughts”.
Here Frege asks regarding a definition of truth as correspondence:
[I]n that case what ought we to do so as to decide whether something is true?
We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a reality, say, cor-
respond in the specified respect. And then we should be confronted by a ques-
tion of the same kind, and the game could begin again. So the attempted
explanation of truth as correspondence breaks down. And any other attempt
to define truth also breaks down. For in a definition certain characteristics
would have to be specified. And in application to any particular case the ques-
tion would always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were
present. So we should be going round in a circle. So it seems likely that the
content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and indefinable.
(CP, 353)
This argument has been given significantly divergent interpretations. None-
theless, it has a pretty clear first-pass reading, as follows. Suppose truth
were definable. Then to decide whether something is true, we should need
to decide whether it meets the characteristics specified by the definition. In
deciding that, however, “the question would always arise whether it were
true that the characteristics were present” (CP, 353). And so the question of
truth would repeat. Or more specifically with truth as correspondence to
reality, Frege is arguing as follows. Suppose truth were defined as correspon-
dence to reality. Then to decide whether the thought that p is true, we should
indeed need to decide whether the thought that p corresponds to reality. In
deciding whether the thought that p corresponds to reality, however, we
should need to decide whether it is true that the thought that p corresponds
to reality. And so the question of truth would repeat.
According to this proto-reading, Frege’s argument involves the premise
that deciding whether a thought corresponds to reality means (or involves,
or requires) deciding whether it is true that the thought corresponds to
reality. Within this premise, however, the content of what is decided is
surely immaterial. So the general view is apparently operative that that
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deciding whether p means (or involves, or requires) deciding whether it is
true that p. Perhaps the claim is conditional: if truth were correspondence
to reality, then deciding whether p would mean deciding whether it is true
that p. Or perhaps it is not. Either way, however, any development of the
proto-reading will need to explain this striking premise. Indeed, doing so
would appear the major exegetical and philosophical task. So Ricketts writes:
The regress argument assumes that if truth is characterized as correspondence,
then the judgment that p requires the … judgment that p corresponds to
Reality, i.e, that it is true that p. Here is the tendentious linchpin of the argu-
ment. To many contemporary ears, this assumption will sound gratuitous.
(“Logic and Truth in Frege”, 130)
And Kremer:
The fundamental question is why, on the correspondence theory, judging that p
will require judging that the thought that p is true.
(“Judgment and Truth in Frege”, 554)
We are in a position to answer this fundamental question. Frege holds
unconditionally that judging that p requires holding the thought that p
to be true. And he does so as a consequence of judgement’s self-con-
sciousness. In judging that p, the subject self-understands as acting cor-
rectly, and so as judging truly that p. And in self-understanding as
judging truly that p, the subject understands that p to be true. So
where the subject judges that p, she therein comprehends what she
judges, that p, to be a truth.
Frege’s argument against the correspondence theorist may thus be given
as follows. Suppose truth were defined as correspondence to reality. Then
deploying this definition to decide truth in the case of the thought that p
will mean judging the thought that p to correspond to reality. By the self-con-
sciousness of judgement, however, doing this will involve holding it to be
true that the thought that p corresponds to reality. (In judging the subject
self-understands as judging truly, and so holds what she judges to be true.)
But definitions for Frege carry an identity of sense between definiens and
definiendum.11 So where truth is defined as correspondence to reality,
holding it to be true that the thought that p corresponds to reality means
holding the thought that the thought that p corresponds to reality to corre-
spond to reality. And so the correspondence theorist faces a regress. Holding
a certain thought to correspond to reality requires holding it to correspond to
reality that that thought corresponds to reality, and so on.
11See, for example, “The definiendum acquires its sense only from the definiens. This sense is built up out
of the senses of the parts of the definiens” (PW, 208). So “if the definiens occurs in a sentence and we
replace it by the definiendum, this does not affect the thought at all” (PW, 208).
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8.
This is a relatively simple argument once the result is in place that holding
something means holding it to be true. Two points are nonetheless worth
highlighting. First, the issue here is not as some have thought one of a pre-
condition. It is not that in order to decide whether p the subject must first
decide whether it is true that p.12 Nor is it that if the correspondence
theory were true, then in order to decide whether p the subject would
have first to decide whether it is true that p.13 The difficulty stems, rather,
from Frege’s claim, explicit in texts we have cited, that deciding whether p
includes deciding whether it is true that p, that the subject does not recognize
that p without therein recognizing the thought that p to be true.
The second point to highlight, one which Frege isn’t explicit about, is that this
is a problem for the correspondence theorist because the thought that p and the
thought that the thought that p corresponds to reality will for them be distinct
thoughts. If ‘corresponds to reality’ is to signify something substantial by which
truth may be defined, then the sentence ‘The thought that Jack is tall corre-
sponds to reality’ must express something other simply than that Jack is tall.
And so by Frege’s argument, it is a consequence of the correspondence
theory that maintaining one thing will mean maintaining also something else –
and so, by repeat, it will mean maintaining an infinity of distinct things.
This second point brings attention back to Frege’s identification of the
thought that p and the thought that it is true that p: truth-identity, as we
called it. Frege does not mention truth-identity in the immediate vicinity of
his indefinability argument, whether in “Logic” or “Thoughts”. And nor as I
argued is it what justifies the argument’s centrally operative assumption
that every assessment is at once an assessment of truth. This assumption
does not arrive in the same way as the claim that every hope is at once a
hope of truth – that is, merely as a consequence of truth-identity. If it did,
Frege’s argument would be both question begging and absurdly prolix: ques-
tion begging because the truth-definer has no reason to accept a premise of
truth-identity, and absurdly prolix because Frege’s discussion of deciding and
inquiring would be entirely unnecessary.14 Frege starts the argument, let’s
underline again, not with a thesis about truth, namely truth-identity, but
with a certain conception of judgement, its conception as the recognition
of the truth of a thought.
12See Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 443.
13This is Ricketts’ position. To avoid distraction, I removed the word ‘prior’ when citing his claim that “the
regress argument assumes that if truth is characterized as correspondence, then the judgment that p
requires the prior judgment that p corresponds to Reality, i.e, that it is true that p” (“Logic and Truth in
Frege”, 130).
14Wolfgang Künne offers an interpretation of Frege’s argument on which it deploys truth-identity as a
premise (Conceptions of Truth, 129–33). It is surely better to admit interpretative defeat than to cast
Frege’s argument as trivially question-begging.
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Still, truth-identity is, we can see, a condition of the coherence of Fregean
judgement, for without it Frege would face essentially the same difficulty as
the correspondence theorist. Without truth-identity, a conception of prop-
ositional commitment under which judging that p means holding it to be
true that p will be a conception under which thinking one thing includes
always thinking something else. Recognizing this, it is natural to ask what
sort of a condition truth-identity is here. Is truth theoretically prior to judge-
ment for Frege, so that his commitment to truth-identity is independent of
his understanding of judgement, a theoretically prior condition of the coher-
ence of that understanding? Or is truth-identity to be explained through
Frege’s conception of judgement, so that truth and judgement are theoreti-
cally coeval?
I cannot justify here an answer to this large question. At a gesture,
however, my reading of Frege would be that truth-identity is explained inde-
pendently of judgement by reference to the pride of place Frege assigns in
his theorizing to the content of the word ‘true’ (PW, 253). More generally,
truth is, I think, prior in Frege to judgement and assertion.15 It follows from
this that we should not look to understand Frege’s stated views on truth –
for example, truth-identity, the simplicity of truth (PW, 129), the view that
truth is not a property “in the ordinary sense” (CP, 354) – by reference to
the argument we have been considering for truth’s indefinability, for this
argument makes essential reference to the nature of propositional commit-
ment. Frege’s indefinability argument, whilst of considerable systematic inter-
est, is nonetheless peripheral to his own theorizing. The argument
demonstrates well enough that truth is indefinable, but it does not illuminate
the theoretical basis of Frege’s views on truth – including its indefinability.
9.
Is Frege’s argument compelling? Well, it surely is not psychologically compel-
ling, in that the correspondence theorist will no doubt merrily reject Frege’s
conception of judgement as the recognition of a truth. And indeed no corre-
spondence theorist has ever, as far as I am aware, been impressed by Frege’s
argument. (I’m not expecting my interpretation to change that.) But it is com-
pelling, I think, in the only sense in which any argument is ever compelling in
15That truth is prior to judgement for Frege is visible, I would suggest, in his repeated stance that the
normative laws of judgement are consequent upon the descriptive laws of truth (see e.g. CP, 351).
More interestingly, the priority is I think dictated by Frege’s “separation of the act [of judgment and
assertion] from its subject matter” (PW, 142), a separation embodied in the use of his assertion
sign. Wittgenstein’s Tractarian criticisms of this use (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, e.g. §§4.063,
4.064, 4.442) issue from his contrary view that truth is not understood other than as correctness in
thinking and saying. For an opposing interpretation of Frege see Ricketts: “Truth is the goal of
judging, and judgment is the recognition of truth. We have no grasp on the one apart from a
grasp on the other” (“Logic and Truth in Frege”, 130–1).
BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 1139
philosophy, namely that it provides a non-trivial way if not of explaining the
truth of its conclusion, then at least of recognizing that truth. Frege shows us
that if truth were definable, the subject would not judge thinking her act
correct. Or again, he shows us that if truth were definable, then judgement
could not be what it is, the acknowledgement of a truth.
Let’s close with some remarks on truth as the goal of judgement. In
Section 3, we placed judgement in the context of various self-conscious
acts for which in acting the subject self-understands as acting correctly.
As in judging the subject self-understands as knowing, so in reading
the subject self-understands as reading faithfully, in calculating the
subject self-understands as calculating correctly, and so on. Part of the
point of this was to suggest, implicitly, that what we have here with
Frege’s articulation of judgement’s self-consciousness is an articulation
of the sense in which judgement aims at knowledge, and so at truth,
the sense in which the judging subject aims to judge truly. Reading
aims at fidelity, inference at validity, calculation at correct calculation
etc. And the sense in which this is so is given by their form of self-con-
sciousness. Reading aims at fidelity in the sense that in reading, the
subject self-understands as reading faithfully: this is how the act’s con-
dition of correctness figures in the mind of the acting subject. And jud-
gement aims at knowledge in the sense that in judging, the subject
self-understands as knowing.
That what has been set out in this paper is inter alia an understanding of
truth as the goal of judgement,16 makes evident a substantial commonality
between the current interpretation of Frege’s indefinability argument and
that of Ricketts. Ricketts asks, “Why, on the correspondence theory, must
one inquire whether the thought that Socrates is mortal corresponds to
Reality in order to determine whether Socrates is mortal?” (“Objectivity and
Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgment”, 78). His answer issues from
the following thought:
We cannot take someone to be making assertions in complete disregard for the
correctness of what he asserts; such a person would be understood to be
merely play-acting or perhaps merely mouthing words.
(“Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgment”, 78)
Ricketts continues:
To take truth to be definable forces a particular construal of this talk of stan-
dards of correctness. For to have a definition of truth is to have a general
description of the conditions that have to be satisfied for the judgment to be
correct. So if truth is definable, then any person who makes a judgment must
have ascertained, or taken himself to have ascertained, whether these
16See PW pp. 2 and 128 for talk of truth as a goal.
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conditions, applied to the thought under consideration, are satisfied. If I judge
that Socrates is mortal then I must have determined that the thought that
Socrates is mortal corresponds with Reality. But to ascertain that some con-
dition holds is to make a judgment. Given the definition of truth, a person
cannot have judged that the thought that Socrates is mortal corresponds
with Reality unless he has judged that the content of this second judgment cor-
responds with Reality. On the correspondence theory then, a person is never in
a position to make a judgment, for no one is ever in a position to have satisfied,
or even think of himself as having satisfied, the standards for judgment that
would ipso facto be provided by its definition of truth.
(“Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgment”, 78)
Aside from a quibble about whether judging a thought to be true appears as
a precondition for the truth-definer on judging that thought, this is essentially
my view. (Ricketts is clearly holding here that if truth were definable, judging
that p would require the subject to have already judged something else.) If
truth were correspondence to reality, Ricketts proposes, judgement’s
regard for its correctness would mean that judging that p entails judging
that the thought that p corresponds to reality. Ricketts does not, however,
surround this proposal with a general, Fregean account of judgement’s intrin-
sic regard for truth. And so he does not explain by means of a derivation from
such an account why, if truth were correspondence to reality, judging one
thing would require holding also something else. I have sought above to
supply this absent material.
The second thing achieved by bringing into clearer view that what is at
issue here is the subject’s regard for the correctness of her act is to reveal
as inept a certain possible objection to Frege’s argument. We made above
an inference from the subject’s self-understanding as judging correctly to
her self-understanding as judging truly. Or again we inferred, from the sub-
ject’s taking what she judges to be true and the supposition that truth is cor-
respondence to reality, that the subject takes what she judges to correspond
to reality. These moves were made with only minimal pause, but might not
the nature of judgement’s correctness, or truth, be opaque at least in
judging to the judging subject? Might not truth be correspondence to
reality without it following that the subject who judges thinking what she
judges to be true thereby judges thinking what she judges to correspond
to reality?
One reply to this objection would be to mount a defence of Frege’s
general position that definitions carry an identity of sense between definien-
dum and definiens. But that would be a large and distracting task. The simpler
response is to point out that the validity of our moves here is implicit in the
fact that what is offered is an understanding of the subject’s aiming at truth.
Our account can spell out the sense in which the subject aims at correct
action only because her self-understanding as judging correctly is a self-
understanding as judging truly. One does not aim in acting to act correctly
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unless one knows in so acting what such correctness is. (The reading subject’s
self-understanding in reading is: ‘I read correctly – that is, faithfully’.) Similarly,
if the subject aims in judging to judge truly, and if truth is correspondence to
fact, then the subject must aim in judging to judge what corresponds to fact.
(In general, one does not aim at something unless one knows in so aiming
what it is to meet that aim, aiming to achieve that.) And the general nature
of definitions to one side, this is enough to give the result that if truth
were definable, the subject would judge only if she holds what she judges
to bear the characteristics specified by the definition.
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